In 1926, Mally proposed the first formal deontic system. As Mally and others soon realized, this system had some rather strange consequences. We show that the strangeness of Mally's system is not so much due to Mally's informal deontic principles as to the fact that he formalized those principles in terms of the propositional calculus. If they are formalized in terms of relevant logic rather than classical logic, one obtains a system which is related to Anderson's relevant deontic logic and not nearly as strange as Mally's own system.
1 Introduction Mally, a student of Meinong, was the first philosopher to build a formal theory of normative concepts [7] . It would be an understatement to say that Mally's Deontik is not held in high esteem today. Føllesdal and Hilpinen [6] call it "strange," "counter-intuitive," and "not acceptable" and mainly wonder "Where did Mally go wrong?" Meyer and Wieringa [10] mention it only "by way of curiosity" before proceeding to what they describe as "the first 'real' system of deontic logic." In this paper, we will show that the strangeness of Mally's system is not so much due to his basic deontic assumptions as to the fact that he formalized those assumptions in terms of the propositional calculus. If they are formalized in terms of relevant logic rather than classical logic, one obtains a system which is related to Anderson's relevant deontic logic [1] and not nearly as strange as Mally's own system. obligatory' (das unbedingt Geforderte) and with a monadic propositional operator ! which he read as 'it is obligatory that' (he read ! A as 'es sei A' or as 'A soll sein'). He translated ' A requires B' as A ⊃ !B. As a result he obtained the following axioms:
Mally formalized (4) as ∃U!U. We agree with Føllesdal and Hilpinen ( [6] , pp. 2-3) that this formula is not well-formed and should be replaced by !U. Mally viewed the latter formula as a theorem ( [7] , §3, formula 15). Mally's principles sound more or less natural but many of the theorems of his system are decidedly strange. For example, one may prove the following theorem:
(For the rest of the proof, see [6] , p. 4, formulas 9-21.) ( †) implies that Mally's system is trivial. It has no genuine deontic content. The deontic operator ! has a purely decorative function and can be defined away by ! A = A.
Although he did not actually discuss ( †), Mally was well aware of the fact that his theory had many strange consequences. Indeed, he classified thirteen of the thirty-five theorems which he derived as befremdlich. Mally defended these strange theorems, but all later deontic logicians (starting with Menger [9] ) have regarded them as fatal to his theory. In their well known account of Mally's system, Føllesdal and Hilpinen added one additional rule of inference: A ≡ B / ! A ≡ !B ( [6] , p. 3). This rule is, however, derivable from ( A ≡ B) ⊃ (! A ≡ !B) which is a theorem in virtue of MD1, so there is no need to introduce it as a primitive rule. These authors also added the following axiom: ! A ≡ ∀P( P ⊃ ! A) ([6] , p. 3). But if propositional quantifiers are introduced in the usual way, then A ≡ ∀P( P ⊃ A) will be a theorem, so ! A ≡ ∀P( P ⊃ ! A) will also be a theorem. There is therefore no reason to introduce this formula as an axiom.
3 Relevant logic Where did Mally go wrong? Like Føllesdal and Hilpinen, we suspect that the unacceptability of his system is not so much due to his informal deontic principles as to the fact that he formalized those principles in terms of the propositional calculus. Føllesdal and Hilpinen suggested that Mally should perhaps have used strict implication instead of material implication. They did not explore this idea and we will not do so either. Rather, we will investigate the consequences of replacing Mally's material implication by relevant implication as formalized in the AndersonBelnap logic of relevant implication R. R is defined as follows ( [3] , chap. 5).
Syntax
A is a formula if and only if: (i) A is an atomic sentence or (ii) B and C are formulas and
. Outer parentheses will usually be omitted.
Axioms and rules

Self-implication
System R Ftu is defined as follows.
Syntax
The same as that of R, except that there are three propositional constants, F, t, and u (F and t are discussed in [3] , §27.1.2). F is 'the conjunction of all propositions', t is 'the conjunction of all truths', u is 'the unconditionally obligatory'.
Axioms
The same as those of R, plus
R Ftu is a conservative extension of R in the sense that all theorems of R Ftu which contain no occurrences of F, t, and u are theorems of R. The term 'system R' will from now on refer to system R Ftu rather than R.
In the following, we will occasionally refer to the following theorems and derived rule of inference of R (the proofs are left to the reader):
Relevant Deontik Our first system of Relevant Deontik, RD, is defined as follows.
Language A is a formula if and only if: (i)
A is a formula of the language of R, or (ii) B is a formula and A = OB. OA is read as 'it is obligatory that A'.
Alethic axioms and rules
System R.
Deontic axioms (compare axioms MD1-MD5 above)
Our second system of Relevant Deontik, RD*, is defined in the same way as RD except that there is one additional axiom:
where U is the unconditionally forbidden. According to Anderson ( [1] , p. 348), the latter formula was first discussed by Bohnert in 1945 [4] .
Theorem 4.1 RD6 is not a theorem of RD.
Proof: Define a function T from the language of RD into the language of R as follows: T (a) = a, where a is an atomic sentence,
T transforms all axioms of RD into theorems of R.
Proof of T (RD1):
1. ( A → B) → ((B → C) → ( A → C)) Pref, Perm, MP 2. (( A → B) & (B → C)) → ( A → C) 1, &Imp, MP 3. T ((( A → OB) & (B → C)) → ( A → OC)) 2, Def T
Proof of T (RD2):
From &Int and Def T .
Proof of T (RD3):
From Self-impl, Adj, and Def T .
Proof of T (RD4):
From Self-impl and Def T .
Proof of T (RD5):
T also transforms all rules of RD into rules of R. So T transforms all theorems of RD into theorems of R.
which is certainly not a theorem of R, so RD6 is not a theorem of RD which was to be proven. We will be not so much interested in AL as in a weaker system AL , which is defined in the same way as AL except that the Axiom of Avoidance is replaced by u • u • u. This axiom is provably equivalent with ¬(u → O¬u) in virtue of Def O and R. AL is weaker than
6 RD* and AL Theorem 6.1 RD* and AL have exactly the same theorems.
Proof: We first show that all theorems of RD* are theorems of AL . Because all rules of inference of RD* are rules of AL , it is sufficient to prove that all axioms of RD* are theorems of AL .
1.
(
With this we have proven that all theorems of RD* are theorems of AL . We now show that all theorems of AL are theorems of RD*. We first show that (u → A) → OA is a theorem of RD.
Ou → Ou Self-impl 2.
In conjunction with RD6 this result implies that OA ←→ (u → A) is a theorem of RD*. Furthermore, RD* has the following theorem:
where C[ A / B] is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of A in C by B (proof: by induction on the length of C; see [5] , §1.6 for some details). Using these facts we may prove that if A is a theorem of AL , A is a theorem of RD*. The proof is by induction on the length of a proof of A in AL . All cases are obvious, except one.
Suppose that Def O is used to derive
One may then use OA ←→ (u → A), Replacement, and MP to carry out the same derivation in RD*. Thus any proof of A in AL is replicable in RD*. This implies that each theorem of AL is a theorem of RD*. This ends the proof of Theorem 6.1.
In sum, the sets of theorems of the four relevant deontic systems we have discussed are related as follows: 
In Theorems 12 and 13 of List I below, ∧ will be translated by • and ∨ by +.
We divide Mally's theorems into five categories for the sake of clarity.
List I
The following list includes all "plausible" theorems of MD whose translations are theorems of RD.
The translations of these formulas are as follows. The numbers of translated formulas are underlined.
The RD-proofs of the translated formulas are generally easy. We only give a hint for 8: the antecedent is provably equivalent with O(( A → B) & (B → C)). 16 was already proven in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
List II
The following list includes all "plausible" theorems of MD whose translations do not seem to be derivable in RD but which are derivable in RD*.
Mally derived 17 from 8 and MD4 but the corresponding derivation does not go through in RD. Mally derived 18 from 17 with the help of the following principle which he mentioned only informally:
18 is definitely not a theorem of RD (proof: as in the proof of Theorem 4.1). 17 and 18 are theorems of RD* in virtue of Contraction, RD6, and 16. 18 is a theorem of RD* because it is an instance of RD6.
List III
The following list includes all "plausible" theorems whose translations are not derivable in RD*.
The translated formulas are not derivable in RD* because they are not derivable in AL as is easily checked. For example, in AL , 19 is an abbreviation of
Most, if not all, of the just-presented seven theorems are less "plausible" than Mally thought. For example, the "strange" formula 22 below is an immediate consequence of V (an axiom of Mally's system), theorem 24, and modus ponens. If 22 is strange, then 24 should be regarded as strange too. But then 19, 23, 25, and 26, which Mally derived from 22 and 24, should not be accepted without hesitation either.
List IV
The following list includes all 'strange' theorems whose translations are not derivable in RD*. Mally's intuitions than his own system MD was, and RD* is even better. This ends the proof of Theorem 7.1.
Four final observations
First, RD* is in better accordance with Mally's intuitions than AL (Anderson's own relevant deontic logic) because the "strange" formula 32 is a theorem of AL in virtue of the Axiom of Avoidance (so N (AL) = 26).
Second, we are now in a position to state where Mally went wrong. In a general sense: by formalizing his deontic principles in terms of classical propositional logic. In a specific sense: at each theorem of MD whose translation is not derivable in RD (Lists II, III, and IV).
Third, Mally regarded 34 (and 35, which is just the contraposed version of 34) as the strangest of his strange theorems. From the perspective of RD*, 1, 2, 7, 20, 21, 27, and 29 are even stranger because the translations of these formulas are not derivable in RD* + 34.
Fourth, ( †), the strange consequence of Mally's theory with which we started, is in a certain sense stranger than 34 because OA → A does not seem to be a theorem of RD + 34. 
Conclusion
We do not wish to defend any of the systems we have discussed. Mally's system is unacceptable because of its triviality. The relevant deontic systems are problematic for the reasons given in [8] . We only wanted to make it clear where Mally went wrong. It was his reliance on classical logic which led him into trouble. If Mally's ideas are expressed in terms of relevant logic rather than classical logic, we obtain a system which is similar to Anderson's relevant deontic logic and not nearly as strange as Mally's original system.
